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In the past decades, the role of the business unit (BU) management accountant or BU controller[1] as 
the economic conscience of the organization has become increasingly important (Jablonski et al., 1993). 
More recently, there has been some debate about the allegedly ‘new’ business-oriented role of 
controllers. It has been suggested that controllers ought to engage less in ‘number crunching’ (Vaivio 
and Kokko, 2006), and extend their involvement in management, as well as their effect on managerial 
decisions (Burns and Vaivio, 2001). The decentralization of the BU controller position, combined with 
the increasing centralization of basic accounting systems in organizations (via ERP systems and related 
consolidation packages), could help in establishing a greater business orientation of BU controllers 
(Järvenpää, 2007). By acting proactively, controllers might even be able to become full-fledged business 
partners of their managers (Weiβenberger and Angelkort, 2011; Weiβenberger et al., 2013). 
Whether the aforementioned change to business partnership is actually occurring or whether it 
is, rather, somewhat of a myth is an issue that has not yet been settled. Although the change does not 
seem to be manifesting itself as extensively or as quickly as is sometimes thought (De Loo et al., 2011; 
Wolf et al., 2015), it seems to be progressing nevertheless (De Loo et al., 2011; Goretzki et al., 2013). 
However, high controller involvement in managerial decisions may not always be desirable or beneficial 
for an organization (Indjejikian and Matĕjka, 2006; Maas and Matĕjka, 2009). It may also not be in the 
interest of controllers, who do not always desire such a role (Pierce and O’Dea, 2003). This could be 
due to differences in controllers’ personal characteristics (Chang et al., 2014).  
These discussions led us to address the following research question: which factors stimulate or 
hinder BU controllers’ influence on managerial decisions taken by their managers? A better 
understanding of BU controllers’ functioning in an organization and the factors impacting on the degree 
of BU controller influence on managerial decisions could help organizations to structure and/or 
(re)design the hierarchical positioning of their BU controllers (Merchant and van der Stede, 2012; Chang 
et al., 2014). 
 There are several qualitative studies that analyze how controllers interact with their managers 
in important business matters (e.g., Lambert and Sponem, 2012; Goretzki et al., 2013). In these studies, 
it is asserted that these interactions are very much context dependent. Some of the elements that seem 
to play a role in this process include the interpersonal relationship between a controller and his/her 
manager(s), which is partially determined by their personal characteristics; and organizational and 
environmental characteristics, such as the financial situation an organization is in, pressure from 
competitors, or strategic issues that have to be considered. Quantitative studies assessing controllers’ 
degree of involvement in managerial decisions are scarce (Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005; Zoni and 
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Merchant, 2007; Wolf et al., 2015). In these studies, it has been asserted that there is considerable 
variance across organizations with respect to the influence controllers have on managerial decision-
making. 
 The present study adopts a contingency approach to assess the influence of controllers on 
managerial decisions (cf. Sathe, 1982; Zoni and Merchant, 2007) and aims to contribute to the extant 
management accounting literature in a number of ways. First, we try to provide insights on how the BU 
controller position might be structured to stimulate greater business influence of controllers, whenever 
this is deemed beneficial for an organization. BU controllers have divided loyalties to their BU 
manager(s) and the corporate controller(s) they have to report to, which makes them an interesting 
subject of study (Pierce and O’Dea, 2003; Byrne and Pierce, 2007; Merchant and van der Stede, 2012). 
Hence, the current study focuses specifically on BU controllers.  
Second, we examine the effect of both organizational factors and controllers’ personality traits 
on their influence on managerial decisions. This is done because the organization theory literature, from 
which the contingency approach evolved, originally discarded the influence of personal characteristics 
on the functioning of organizations, relying heavily on other contingency variables such as an 
organization’s environment and the information technologies it uses (Byrne and Pierce, 2007). This 
view has met with increasing criticism (Widener, 2014). We wish to take some of this criticism into 
account. Our approach is in line with role theory (Katz and Khan, 1978). These authors argue that 
organizational characteristics, interpersonal relationships, and what they call “attributes of the person” 
(p. 196), which can be regarded as someone’s personal characteristics, jointly determine one’s role in 
an organization. It may therefore be insightful to analyze some of these characteristics in a single study 
(see also Sathe, 1982). 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical basis for 
the empirical model, from which seven hypotheses are developed. Section 3 contains a description of 
the data used. After listing the results of our empirical analyses in Section 4, we present a discussion 
and suggestions for future research in Section 5. 
 
2. Literature 
2.1 Controller influence on managerial decisions 
As was mentioned above, this study focuses on BU controllers. These are “controllers in senior 
positions, who are responsible for the financial control function on divisions or business unit levels, 
typically operating between headquarters and the operating company level … balancing strategic, 
operating, and financial aspects of control” (Roozen and Steens, 2006, p. 24). BU controllers are often 
members of BU management teams (Zimmerman, 2014). Consequently, they have to balance two 
potentially conflicting roles: (1) a support role (helping managers to identify profitable action strategies) 
and (2) a control role (being responsible for the accuracy of financial reports and the integrity of a BU’s 
internal controls) (Sathe, 1982; Pierce and O’Dea, 2003; Chang et al., 2014). A stronger emphasis on 
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one role can reduce the effectiveness of the other role (Sathe, 1982; Maas, 2006; Byrne and Pierce, 
2007). Role behavior thus seems to differ when it comes to providing business support vis-à-vis 
controlling a business unit.  
 
The extent to which controllers fulfill their support role is defined by Sathe (1982, p. 10) as “controller 
involvement in management”. Controller involvement in management is interpreted as the way in which 
controllers participate in operational and strategic business decision-making. Unfortunately, Sathe did 
not provide a clear operationalization of the controller involvement in management concept. Such an 
operationalization has been provided by Matĕjka (2002). Even though he operationalized controller 
involvement in management in a valid way, his operationalization solely focused on controller influence 
on managerial decisions. Some controllers might be involved in decision-making without having any 
influence on what their managers do, as Argyris (1952) showed in a budget participation setting. 
Involvement without influence is called “pseudo-participation” (Brownell, 1983, p. 309). Matĕjka 
(2002) seems to assume that controller influence and involvement can be equated. We claim that 
influence is part of involvement but cannot be treated as a substitute, because of the possible presence 
of pseudo-participation. Since we wanted to stick to the extant literature as closely as possible, we 
decided to use the aforementioned operationalization, accepting that by so doing, controller influence is 
emphasized rather than controller involvement. The inferences we draw about controller influence hold 
for controller involvement as well, but there may be additional factors affecting involvement that we 
cannot uncover when we adhere to Matĕjka’s (2002) interpretation of influence and involvement.  
Another and related issue is that since the controller’s viewpoint is taken as the study’s point of 
departure (cf. Zoni and Merchant, 2007), it is debatable whether controllers’ impressions of their 
influence on managerial decisions can be equated with their actual influence[2]. For this reason, we will 
refer to what we are going to assess as perceived controller influence in management. 
 
2.2 Personality traits 
Many approaches are available to describe and analyze people’s personality traits (Digman, 1990; 
Furnham et al., 2009). Researchers have introduced personality theories which try to reduce personality 
traits to several predispositions that are assumed to hold throughout a person’s life. Among others, this 
has resulted in the Five Factor (“Big Five”) Model, which has become one of the most widely used and 
extensively researched models of personality traits in academe (Barrick et al., 2001). The Big Five 
Model assumes that most individual differences in personality can be assigned to the following five sets 
of traits (Gosling et al., 2003, p. 506): (1) extraversion; (2) conscientiousness; (3) emotional stability[3]; 
(4) agreeableness; and (5) openness to new experiences. Combinations of these sets of traits can be 
linked with personality profiles and career styles (Howard and Howard, 2001). High (or low) scores on 
one dimension can be combined with equally high (or low) scores on the other dimensions. In the 
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following sections, we will describe how these sets of traits may be interpreted when examining 
controllers.  
 
2.2.1  Extraversion 
A person’s degree of extraversion pertains to characteristics such as sociability, assertiveness, and 
positive emotionality (Anderson et al., 2008). People who are extravert are usually jovial, vocal, and 
focused on interactions with others (Eswaran et al., 2011). Anderson et al. (2008) find a positive 
relationship between someone’s degree of extraversion and his/her influence on colleagues at work, 
especially in consultancy firms. Moutafi et al. (2007) conclude that extraversion is positively correlated 
with higher management levels. 
 We expect that more extravert BU controllers are better able to express themselves. They may, 
consequently, influence members of a BU management team and/or other colleagues to a larger extent 
(Roozen and Steens, 2006). Therefore, the following hypothesis can be formulated:  
H1. Extraversion is positively related to perceived controller influence on managerial decisions. 
 
2.2.2  Conscientiousness 
Conscientiousness refers to the degree to which a person tries to reach his/her goals at work. The 
generally accepted definition of conscientiousness includes a number of different characteristics: 
competence, orderliness, dutifulness, striving for achievement, self-discipline, and deliberation (Moutafi 
et al., 2007). Mount et al. (1998) assert that conscientiousness is positively related to job performance 
for jobs that involve frequent interactions with others, both inside and outside an organization. Anderson 
et al. (2008) find a positive relationship between someone’s conscientiousness and his/her influence on 
other people’s actions in an engineering department, but not in a consultancy firm.  
  Because controllers have to work with detailed ‘facts and figures’, which have to be periodically 
provided and checked (Zimmerman, 2014), we surmise that they have to be highly disciplined to do 
their job well and become (more) engaged in managerial decision-making. We expect that BU 
controllers need a focused and ordered attitude for this to happen. Therefore, we hypothesize the 
following: 
H2. Conscientiousness is positively related to perceived controller influence on managerial decisions. 
 
2.2.3  Emotional stability 
Emotional stability concerns the degree to which “an individual is secure, stable, relaxed, self-sufficient, 
not anxious, and tolerant of stress” (Mount et al., 1998, p. 146). Emotionally stable persons react to 
difficult situations in a calm and steady fashion. People with low emotional stability are viewed as 
“anxious, insecure, emotional, and tense” (Mount and Barrick, 1998, p. 852). Salgado (1997) suggests 
that emotional stability can be used as a predictor of job performance for five occupational groups: 
professionals, policemen, managers, salespersons, and skilled employees. Mount et al. (1998) find a 
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positive relation between emotional stability and job performance for jobs involving extensive personal 
interaction.  
We expect that more emotionally stable, rationally acting BU controllers exhibit a greater 
influence on managerial decision-making, as stated in our third hypothesis:  
H3. Emotional stability is positively related to perceived controller influence on managerial decisions. 
 
2.2.4  Agreeableness 
Agreeableness concerns the degree to which an individual is “cooperative, warm, and agreeable as 
opposed to cold, disagreeable, and antagonistic” (Salgado, 1997, p. 30). High levels of agreeableness 
are associated with persons who are “good-natured, flexible, cooperative and want to get along with 
others by being tolerant and accepting” (Mount et al., 1998, p. 146). Salgado (1997) finds a positive 
relationship between agreeableness and job performance for professionals, skilled employees, and 
managers. Mount et al. (1998) argue that there is a positive relation between agreeableness and 
performance in jobs involving much personal interaction. However, Anderson et al. (2008) do not find 
that agreeableness affects the influence someone has on (the actions of) other employees in an 
organization. On the other hand, Eswaran et al. (2011) assert that there is a positive relationship between 
agreeableness and job involvement. 
 We expect that more agreeable controllers have less influence on managerial decisions because 
they are likely to primarily assist their manager, and will therefore relatively easily accept what the latter 
proposes, instead of engaging in critical discussions with him/her (Byrne and Pierce, 2007). Hence, our 
fourth hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
H4. Agreeableness is negatively related to perceived controller influence on managerial decisions. 
 
2.2.5  Openness to new experiences 
Openness to new experiences defines “individuals who are creative, curious, and cultured in contrast to 
people who are practical with narrow interests” (Salgado, 1997, p. 30). The extant literature has not 
identified a clear relationship between openness and influence. For instance, Anderson et al. (2008) find 
weak and inconclusive effects between someone’s openness and his/her influence on other employees 
in an organization. Salgado (1997) suggests that a limited relationship exists between these variables, 
while Mount et al. (1998) identify no clear relationship. Eswaran et al. (2011) paint a different picture, 
stating that there is a significant, positive relationship between openness and job involvement.  
However, Byrne and Pierce (2007) suggest that when controllers, wittingly and explicitly, use 
new, innovative accounting tools in the creation of information and consequently challenge their 
managers with unexpected advice, they may be granted a larger role in managerial decision-making 
(because their prestige among managers increases). Therefore, our fifth hypothesis is defined as follows: 




2.3  Organizational characteristics 
As stated earlier, this study also includes several organizational characteristics that, we believe, impact 
on a controller’s influence on managerial decisions. These characteristics have been mentioned (Sathe, 
1982) and studied (e.g., Zoni and Merchant, 2007; De Loo et al., 2011; Wolf et al., 2015) before, but 
not specifically at the BU level. 
 
2.3.1  Decentralization 
Decentralization is present when “corporate management assigns decision rights to lower-level 
managers” (Abernethy et al., 2004, p. 546). In decentralized BUs, corporate managers can reduce their 
information processing requirements by delegating decision-making rights to lower hierarchical levels 
in an organization. Corporate management then typically exerts control by relying on financial controls 
(Merchant and van der Stede, 2012). A BU controller is typically seen as the most appropriate candidate 
to support financial decision-making, given his/her position in a BU (Zimmerman, 2014). He/she usually 
has some influence on preparing plans and budgets, challenging operating managers’ plans and actions, 
and participates in a broad range of business decisions (Merchant and van der Stede, 2012). Through 
decentralization, BU controllers can take on roles that are deemed important by their managers, and 
extend their influence on managerial decisions (Roozen and Steens, 2006). This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H6. The decentralization of decision rights to a BU is positively related to perceived controller influence 
on managerial decisions. 
 
2.3.2  Information asymmetry 
Information asymmetry is present when lower-level managers in an organization have specific 
knowledge that their superiors do not have. In some organizations, BU controllers report directly to their 
BU managers. When this happens, corporate controllers are likely to have limited access to BU 
information, so that the level of information asymmetry between a corporate controller and a BU 
controller is substantial. In other organizations, corporate controllers may supervise BU controllers more 
directly. In these circumstances, BU controllers will mainly report to corporate staff. Information 
asymmetry between corporate controllers and BU controllers will be less extreme than in the former 
situation. In such situations, corporate controllers’ supervision can also reduce potential emotional 
attachments between BU controllers and their operating units, which may further decrease their impact 
on managerial decision-making (Sathe, 1982; Merchant and van der Stede, 2012).  
We expect that controller influence on managerial decisions is large when information 
asymmetry between BU controllers and corporate controllers is substantial. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis can be formulated: 
H7. Information asymmetry between a BU controller and his/her corporate controller is positively 




2.4 Control variables 
In line with previous studies (Sathe, 1982; Matĕjka, 2002; Indejikian and Matĕjka, 2006; Naranjo-Gil et 
al., 2009; Wolf et al., 2015), the following five control variables have been included:  
(1) A BU’s last year performance. Poor performance in a previous period is a commonly used indicator 
of current organizational stress. When an organization enters a stressful period, corporate management 
often tightens management controls, so that there is less room for a BU controller to influence 
managerial decisions. 
(2) A BU manager’s financial knowledge, represented by BU managers’ financial education. A 
financially trained BU manager can have the opportunity to influence a BU controller’s views and 
actions. He/she may then be less likely to accept the latter’s advice.  
(3) A BU controller’s work experience. As a controller’s experience in an organization grows, he/she 
may be less able to embrace and/or evaluate new ideas (quickly), thereby mitigating his/her impact on 
managerial decisions.  
(4) The number of FTEs is a proxy for organizational size. Corporate management typically relies 
more heavily on BU controllers’ expertise with increasing size and complexity of an organization.  
(5) Three dummy variables have been included to control for effects related to specific industries: the 
service sector, the non-profit sector, and financial services. The fourth category (manufacturing and 
construction companies) is the base category, for which no separate dummy variable has been defined. 
 
Figure I summarizes our research model. 
 
INSERT FIGURE I HERE 
 
 
3. Research method 
3.1 Sample description 
The data for this study were collected in Dutch organizations by means of surveys administered by part-
time Master of Science degree students in Controlling (from a single university). This approach was 
adopted because surveys make it possible to attract large groups of respondents at relatively low costs 
(Smith, 2015). All students worked as (junior or assistant) controllers at the time of this study. They 
were asked to approach BU controllers in their networks who might be willing to participate in the 
research. Apart from generating high response rates, this approach mitigated potential problems with 
the understanding of survey items and respondent identification since students could offer concise 
explanations whenever problems arose. We prepared students for their role in the data collection process 
in two separate sessions before the survey was spread. We assumed that the respondents they had 
selected (using two criteria that are introduced below) would be able to answer all questions they would 
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be confronted with. However, there were cases in which they could not do this, even after students had 
offered an explanation of what a particular question entailed. We only included those surveys in which 
respondents were able to answer all of the questions we wanted to use in our analyses. We also surmised 
that they provided honest answers. We can therefore assume that key information bias is negligible.  
By collecting data in the way we did, we created a convenience sample. This is comparable to 
what has been done in other, related studies (Byrne and Pierce, 2007; Zoni and Merchant, 2007). A 
group of BU controllers pre-tested the survey, using pre-test methods that had been proposed by faculty 
members from the university. These tests were in line with the Three-Step Test-Interview (TSTI) method 
(Hak et al., 2008). All respondents had to be controllers in BUs that met two conditions: (1) the BU 
manager of the BU had to have profit responsibility, reporting to a higher level in the organization (such 
as corporate headquarters); and (2) at least 50 employees (in full-time equivalents/FTEs) had to work in 
the BU. By so doing, we ensured that BU managers had decision rights in their BU. In total, 119 BU 
controllers working in 77 different organizations completed the survey. We did not control for firm fixed 
effects in the sample, which is in line with previous studies (see Zoni and Merchant, 2007, for instance).  
In our sample, 57 respondents worked in manufacturing and construction companies (47.9%), 
34 in non-financial services (28.6%), 19 in financial services (16.0%), and 7 in the public sector (5.9%). 
Only 2 respondents (1.6%) did not indicate the sector in which they operated. Because respondents 
completed the surveys in face-to-face meetings with students, exclusion of incomplete surveys was 
limited.  
Below, we will discuss the measurement of the relevant constructs in this study. All the relevant 
items, survey questions, item level descriptive statistics, factor analysis results, and indicator loadings 
are shown in Appendix A. A Harman one-factor test was conducted on all key items relevant for this 
study (Harman, 1976). The lowest factor loading was 0.003; the highest loading was 0.709. Because a 






3.2  Measurements 
3.2.1  Controller influence 
We measured the degree of perceived controller influence on management with an instrument taken 
from Matĕjka (2002). This instrument proposes a number of financial measures that BU controllers can 
typically influence: receivables, inventories, operating expenses, capital expenses, and other benefits 
that accrue when financial analysis and expertise are brought to bear in business decisions (Sathe, 1982). 
Matĕjka (2002) extends Sathe’s categorization by including the following items/issues that controllers 
commonly influence at the BU level: incentive systems, targeted customer segments, and the range of 
products/services offered. A factor analysis with varimax rotation of Matĕjka’s instrument yielded two 
factors. The first factor explains 33.4% of the variance of the underlying items, and the second factor 
explains 17.2%. The Cronbach’s alpha values of these factors are 0.78 and 0.81, respectively.  
  One item (capital expenses) was not included in the remainder of our analyses, because it had 
low loadings on both factors. This result may not be surprising, since capital decisions in an organization 
are often in the hands of financial managers and risk officers, and are not solely a BU manager’s or BU 
controller’s responsibility (Zimmerman, 2014). We distinguished two variables on the basis of the factor 
analysis: operational perceived influence (OPERPIM) and strategic perceived influence (STRATPIM) 
on management decisions. OPERPIM (pertaining to the following operating areas: accounts receivable, 
inventory, and operating expenses) focuses on controller influence on short-term, operational decisions. 
STRATPIM (which includes incentive systems, customer segmentation, and the range of 
products/services offered), describes controller influence on long-term, strategically oriented decisions. 
These results (at the BU level) are similar to Zoni and Merchant’s (2007) findings (at the corporate 
level). 
 
3.2.2  Personality traits 
To ‘capture’ the Five Factor Model, Gosling et al. (2003) developed the Ten Item Personality Inventory 
(TIPI) instrument. The authors tested the validity of this instrument and found that the ten items it 
contained constituted a comprehensive representation of the Five Factor Model. We used the TIPTI 
instrument because of the necessarily limited length of our survey.  
Each personality trait consequently consists of two descriptors. Every descriptor uses a common 
stem: “I see myself as ...”. The descriptors are rated on a five-point scale, ranging from 1 (disagree 
strongly) to 5 (agree strongly). These descriptors are listed in Appendix A. They are labelled EXTRAV, 
CONSC, STABLE, OPEN, and AGREA (following Section 2.2). A factor analysis with varimax 
rotation suggested a five-factor solution. These factors explain 73.9% of the variance in the underlying 
items. All paired items fit the corresponding personality traits, except for one descriptor (‘conventional, 
uncreative’), which loaded more strongly on factor 1 than on factor 5. Following Howard and Howard 
(2001) and Gosling et al. (2003), we decided to combine this descriptor with factor 5. By so doing, the 
five traits became fully in line with the extant literature.  
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3.2.3  Decentralization 
The decentralization instrument stems from Abernethy et al. (2004), who use an adapted version of 
Gordon and Narayanan’s (1984) instrument. Decentralization measures the extent to which a BU has 
decision-making authority across several types of decisions. The decision areas that Abernethy et al. 
(2004) distinguish include strategy, investments, marketing, internal processes, and human resource 
management.  
Authorization was measured on a scale ranging from 1 (100% BU authorization) to 5 (100% 
corporate management authorization). These items were reverse coded in our survey (reverse code = 6 
minus actual score) and then factorized. A factor analysis with varimax rotation resulted in one factor, 
called DECENTR, which explains 46.2% of the variance in the underlying items. The Cronbach’s alpha 
value of DECENTR is 0.71.  
 
3.2.4  Information asymmetry 
Dunk (1993) proposes an instrument to measure information asymmetry between divisional managers 
and their superiors. We adjusted this instrument to measure information asymmetry between BU 
controllers and corporate controllers, using six items ranging from 1 (the corporate controller is much 
more familiar with a BU’s business affairs than the BU controller) to 5 (the BU controller is much more 
familiar with a BU’s business affairs). A factor analysis with varimax rotation indicated that one factor, 
which we call INFOASYM, explains 56.7% of the variance in the underlying items. The Cronbach’s 
alpha value of INFOASYM is 0.84.  
 
3.2.5 Control variables 
Firstly, we controlled for the last year’s performance of a BU. This instrument was based on three items 
taken from Bouwens and van Lent (2007). A factor analysis with varimax rotation yielded one factor, 
which explains 73.8% of the variance in the underlying items. This factor is called ‘PERFORM’. The 
Cronbach’s alpha value of PERFORM is 0.82. 
 Secondly, we controlled for the level of a BU manager’s financial knowledge, represented by 
his/her financial education (Naranjo-Gil et al., 2009). This variable (EDUMGR) was measured by one 
item. A respondent could select his/her level of financial education using the following categories: 5 = 
Certified Public Accountant (CPA) or Executive Master of Finance and Control; 4 = University Master 
of Science level (MSc); 3 = University Master of Arts (MA), Bachelor level at a regular university 
(BSc), or Bachelor level at a university of applied sciences (BASc); 2 = upper vocational secondary 
education in business and administration; and 1 = other level of education. We based these categories 
on the Dutch education system.  
Thirdly, we controlled for a BU controller’s work experience (WRKEXP). BU controllers were 
asked how many years they had worked (a) for their current organization, (b) as a BU controller and (c) 
for this BU (in any role). WRKEXP was calculated as the average score across these three items.  
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Fourthly, we used the logarithm of the number of employees (in FTE) in the organization as a 
proxy for its size (LOGSIZE). Finally, as stated in Section 2.4, we added three dummy variables to 
correct for industry effects: SERVICE = the service sector, PUBLIC = non-profit sector, and FINSERV 
= financial services. Our base category, for which no dummy variable was defined, contains 
manufacturing and construction firms. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Research model 
We analyzed the hypotheses in Section 2 using Partial Least Squares (PLS). PLS allows complex models 
to be estimated with relatively small sample sizes (Verbeeten and Speklé, 2015). It requires fewer 
assumptions than Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with respect to multicollinearity, omitted variables 
bias, and skewed, non-normal distributions of variables (Abernethy and Bouwens, 2005; Verbeeten and 
Speklé, 2015). In addition, the two levels of perceived controller influence on managerial decisions that 
we distinguish could be estimated in a single path model. 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
BU controllers were asked to identify their direct superior: the BU manager or the corporate controller. 
In 54 cases (45.4%), the BU manager was the direct/hierarchical superior, and the corporate controller 
the functional superior of the BU controller. In 16 cases (13.4%), the corporate controller was a BU 
controller’s only superior, and in 20 cases (16.8%), the BU manager was his/her only superior. In the 
other 26 cases (21.8%), other superiors, such as the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), were involved, and 
in 3 cases (2.5%) values were missing. On average, BU controllers had nine years of work experience 
in their current organization. They had held the BU controller position for more than five years. On 
average, BU controllers had worked in their current BU for a little over three years. Of all 119 
controllers, 57.2% held a Master of Science degree, and 38.7% a Bachelor of Science (or related) degree. 
The remaining BU controllers (4.1%) had lower levels of education.  
 Table I presents the descriptive statistics[4] of all the variables used in the PLS analyses. The 
average scores of STRATPIM (mean = 2.42) and OPERPIM (mean = 3.27) differ significantly from one 
another[5]. Therefore, on average, BU controllers seem to influence operating decisions to a greater 
extent than they do the strategic decisions of their BU managers.  
 
INSERT TABLE I HERE 
 
Table I shows the average scores of BU controllers’ personal characteristics: conscientiousness 
(CONSC, mean = 8.61), emotional stability (STABLE, mean = 8.21), openness (OPEN, mean = 8.20), 
extraversion (EXTRAV, mean = 6.93), and agreeableness (AGREA, mean = 5.67). BU controllers 
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appear to have personal traits that make up a distinctive personal profile. They have very high scores on 
conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness; they have medium to high scores on extraversion, 
and they have medium scores on agreeableness.  
 Table II displays the correlation matrix of the dependent and independent variables in our model. 
STRATPIM and OPERPIM are significantly, and positively, correlated at the 0.01 level of significance 
(0.275). The strategic influence of BU controllers (STRATPIM) is also positively related to the degree 
of decentralization in an organization (DECENTR: 0.242) and the performance of a BU (PERFORM: 
0.180). STRATPIM is negatively related to a BU controller’s work experience (WRKEXP: -0.173). The 
influence of a BU controller on operational decisions (OPERPIM) is positively related to his/her 
openness (OPEN: 0.195) and negatively related to his/her agreeableness (AGREA: -0.220). OPERPIM 
appears to be less substantive in the service and non-profit sectors than in other sectors (SERVICE: -
0.255; PUBLIC: -0.238). We also find that BU managers have a higher level of financial education in 
larger organizations than in small-sized organizations (EDUMGR: 0.240). In addition, Table II suggests 
that the independent variables do not exhibit too much multicollinearity (all correlations are below 
0.50)[6].  
 
INSERT TABLE II HERE 
 
4.3 Hypotheses testing 
The assessment of a measurement model in PLS is comparable with principle component analysis. All 
PLS indicators (which are reported in the tables in Appendix A) are higher than 0.50, which indicates 
that these items contribute substantially to the PLS model. To assess the reliability of the measurement 
model, we evaluated the composite reliability (CR) and the average variance extracted (AVE) of our 
variables. The data in Table I show that composite reliability (CR) is acceptable, because all scores are 
over 0.80, except for OPERPIM (0.731) and STRATPIM (0.799). The AVE scores of OPERPIM and 
DECENTR are less than 0.50, which means that convergent validity is relatively low. However, the 
square root of the AVE scores of all variables turn out be larger than the bivariate correlations between 
that variable and the other exogenous variables in the model (as can be seen in Table II), indicating 
substantial discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2016).  
 Effect sizes can be calculated by means of the f2-statistic. According to Hair et al. (2016, p. 
201), f2-values of 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 signify small, medium, and large effects, respectively. Our f2-
values range from 0.002 for LOGSIZE and 0.003 for CONSC to 0.163, 0.122 and 0.134 for SERVIC, 
PUBLIC and FINSERV, respectively. This indicates small to moderate effect sizes for the independent 
variables under consideration. The effect size of CONSC is by far the lowest of the personality traits 
included in this study. Hence, we may expect to find no significant relationship between 
conscientiousness and controller influence.  
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 Finally, we assessed the predictive quality of our model using the Stone-Geisser (Q2) test (Hair 
et al., 2016, p. 202). The Q2-values for STRATCIM and OPERCIM are 0.025 and 0.096, respectively. 
The Q2-value for INFOASYM is 0.080, and 0.005 for PERFORM. Since all of these values are larger 
than zero, we can conclude that our model has sufficient predictive relevance, and that it is likely to 
accurately estimate the latent variables involved. 
 As Table III shows, STRATPIM is positively related to BU controllers who are extravert 
(EXTRAV path = 0.152, t = 1.451), and positively related to BU controllers who are calm and resilient 
(STABLE path = 0.159, t = 1.323) (Hypotheses 1 and 3). The coefficients of the other personal traits 
do not differ significantly from zero, so that the expected positive relationship between 
conscientiousness (path = -0.025, t = 0.259) and controller influence on strategic decisions (Hypothesis 
2) is not supported. No relationship is found between agreeableness (path = 0.005, t = 0.047), openness 
(path = 0.025, t = 0.220) and STRATPIM[7] (Hypotheses 4 and 5). STRATPIM is positively related to 
a BU’s degree of decentralization (as stipulated in Hypothesis 6, DECENTR path = 0.202, t = 1.685). 
This finding indicates that in cases where decision rights are decentralized to a BU, a BU controller’s 
influence on strategic decisions is larger than in more centralized organizations. The data do not support 
the relationship between information asymmetry (path = 0.053, t = 0.464) and STRATPIM (Hypothesis 
7).  
 Table II shows that information asymmetry has a positive correlation with both performance 
and the degree of BU decentralization, but no significant correlation with the two types of controller 
influence. STRATPIM is not significantly related to a BU controller’s work experience (WRKEXP path 
= -0.106, t = 1.150) and the industry dummies.  
 
INSERT TABLE III HERE 
 
Table III also presents the results of the PLS analysis of OPERPIM. We find that OPERPIM is 
negatively related to BU controllers who are agreeable (AGREA: path = -0.180, t = 1.925, Hypothesis 
4). This finding is not in line with studies by Salgado (1997) and Mount et al. (1998), among others. It 
suggests that BU controllers who are critical have more influence on the operational decisions taken by 
their managers than their less critical colleagues. Such a relationship was not found for STRATPIM. 
The data do not support the other predicted relationships between OPERPIM and EXTRAV (path = 
0.075, t = 0.731), CONSC (path = -0.043, t = 0.439), STABLE (path = 0.075, t = 0.912), and OPEN 
(path = 0.086, t = 0.810) (Hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 5).  
 OPERPIM is positively related to a BU manager’s financial education (EDUMGR path = 0.132, 
t = 1.450). This result, at the BU level, supports Zoni and Merchant’s (2007) finding at the corporate 
level. However, the data do not support the relationship between decentralization (path = -0.004, t = 
0.036) and OPERPIM (Hypothesis 6). This suggests that more decentralization tends to be associated 
with greater BU controller influence on strategic management decisions, but not on operational 
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management decisions. Furthermore, no statistically significant relation between information 
asymmetry and OPERPIM was found (path = 0.056, t = 0.498) (Hypothesis 7). Apparently, BU 
controllers automatically have more influence on operational decisions, irrespective of their relationship 
with their BU manager or corporate controller. Our analyses also do not demonstrate a direct relationship 
between organizational size and both types of controller influence. The coefficients of the industry 
dummies are all negatively related to OPERPIM at the 0.01 level of significance. Figure II summarizes 
our results. 
 
INSERT FIGURE II HERE 
 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
5.1. Findings 
The first, major finding of this study concerns controller influence in general. At the BU level, influence 
has two dimensions: influence on strategic decisions and influence on operational decisions. This 
difference supports the conclusions formulated by Matĕjka (2002) and Zoni and Merchant (2007), 
although they examined controllers at the corporate level. Our analyses also indicate that all BU 
controllers find that they have some influence on the operational decisions made by their manager(s) 
(OPERPIM varies from 1.3 to 5.0), but not all BU controllers indicate that they can influence strategic 
decisions (STRATPIM varies from 1.0 to 4.6). Apparently, influence on operational decisions is easier 
for controllers to accomplish, perhaps since this is commonly regarded as an important part of their work 
(Byrne and Pierce, 2007; Zimmerman, 2014). Traditionally, controllers focused on operational tasks, 
safeguarding the integrity and quality of the (mainly financial) information provided in and by 
organizations. Despite the automation of many of these tasks by ERP systems and related consolidation 
packages, controllers still seem to (be required to) do considerable operational work (De Loo et al., 
2011). However, their influence now sometimes seems to extend to strategic matters, which were 
originally the domain of (their) managers (see also Byrne and Pierce, 2007). We cannot claim, however, 
that all BU controllers have become the ‘business partner’ of their manager, as is sometimes proclaimed, 
especially in the professional management literature. Their influence on operational matters would then 
be negligible - which it is not. We find that most BU controllers fulfil a ‘hybrid’ role (Burns and 
Baldvinsdottir, 2005; Byrne and Pierce, 2007; De Loo et al., 2011), focusing on operational as well as 
strategic decision-making, but to a different extent[8]. BU controllers’ work thus tends to be multi-
faceted (cf. Lambert and Sponem, 2012; Goretzki et al., 2013). 
The second group of findings relate to BU controllers’ personality traits. BU controllers have 
high scores on conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness, medium to high scores on 
extraversion, and medium scores on agreeableness. These results support the generally held image of 
controllers as conscientious, calm, unemotional, and resilient professionals (Zimmerman, 2014).  
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Still, it is striking that the score on agreeableness is medium instead of low. Someone would 
expect BU controllers to frequently challenge their managers, and not to be that agreeable when 
important business decisions are made. Assuming that the effect of socially desirable answers in our 
sample is limited (as elaborated in the following section), this could imply that BU managers and BU 
controllers have worked together for a sufficiently substantial period of time to get used to and 
accommodate each other's views, so that they know what to expect from one another when important 
business decisions have to be made. Consequently, it may be that BU managers automatically 
incorporate their controllers' views in the decisions they make. Given that, on average, BU controllers 
have held their position for more than five years, this could explain the relatively low score on 
agreeableness. However, in the case of controllers’ perceived influence on operational decisions, it turns 
out that they cannot be too laid back (as indicated by our results for Hypothesis 4). When controllers 
are too agreeable in operational affairs, they will become less influential. This finding is in line with 
results reported by Byrne and Pierce (2007). For STRATPIM, no such relationship was found. 
We also found that an increase in decentralization tends to be accompanied by greater BU 
controller influence on strategic decisions, but not on operational decisions. This supports our idea that 
influence on operational decisions is something that controllers are commonly expected to exert 
(Zimmerman, 2014). Whether a controller also becomes engaged in strategic decisions seems to be 
negotiable, perhaps since this has traditionally been part of his/her manager’s work; this manager 
consequently may not accept or endorse such influence (see also Byrne and Pierce, 2007).  
 In addition, this study suggests a positive relationship between STRATPIM and extraversion 
and emotional stability. OPERPIM turned out to be related to critical thinking (low agreeableness), but 
STRATPIM turned out not to be related. This raises the following questions: do controllers stop being 
critical when they gain more influence on strategic decisions? If so, then why? Are critical controllers 
perhaps excluded from exerting influence on strategic decisions? Etc. 
We put the view that controllers could become too critical for their managers once they have 
been allowed to engage in strategic decision-making. Managers may consequently prevent further 
influence. Another explanation could be related to differences between strategic and operational 
decision-making processes. When controllers want to influence strategic decisions, they may have to 
exert influence early on in the decision-making process (before a decision is ‘on the table’), since 
managers may not accept their influence at the stage when a final decision has to be made, because this 
is perceived to be their task (Byrne and Pierce, 2007). Influencing operational decisions typically 
happens at a later stage, when decisions are discussed and specific ‘facts and figures’ have to be prepared 
to sustain these.  
Goretzki et al. (2013) assert that when controllers are willing to have an impact on strategic 
decisions, and when this is suggested in a way their managers can appreciate, such influence may be 
granted[9]. However, Lambert and Sponem (2012) state that the possibility to become involved in 
strategic decision-making is very much dependent on the authority that a particular controller, and the 
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controller function as a whole, has in an organization. When authority is substantial, controllers can 
move beyond carrying out technical tasks and increasingly embrace advisory work – also in strategic 
matters. Conversely, controllers’ involvement may be limited when a defensive attitude is taken by their 
manager(s). In such cases, it will not help when a controller is also critical. His/her influence may then 
be further decreased.  
A third group of findings relates to organizational factors. As we have seen, positive 
relationships were found between BU performance and both types of controller influence. We also found 
a positive relationship between the degree of decentralization and BU controllers’ influence on strategic 
decisions. Thus, decentralization may be a way to increase BU controller’s influence on strategic 
decisions. This study does not support the relationship between OPERPIM and decentralization. 
Therefore, we claim that a BU controller can always influence operational decisions, regardless of the 
level of decentralization in his/her organization.  
This brings us to answering our main research question: which factors stimulate or hinder BU 
controllers’ influence on managerial decisions taken by their managers? Just like Byrne and Pierce 
(2007), we propose that BU controllers can partially influence their own role. We refine Byrne and 
Pierce’s conclusions by putting forward two types of influence: on operational and on strategic 
decisions. In addition, we suggest that there are more opportunities for BU controllers to increase their 
influence on strategic decisions than on operational decisions. As stated earlier, it should be kept in mind 
that when BU controllers are asked to engage in strategic decision-making, this may happen at the early 
stages of the decision-making process, since the strategic decision itself is typically made by their BU 
manager. Therefore, this type of influence is something that BU controllers have to time well. They 
cannot apply ‘too much’ influence ‘too late’, when a manager feels it is now up to him/her to finalize a 
decision. Our results suggest that BU controllers could exert considerable influence on strategic 
decisions when they are calm, conscientious, and constructive, and when they are able to challenge their 
BU managers in a way that the latter can appreciate. However, we also believe that they cannot be too 
critical, as this is likely to result in relatively little influence. Organizations could therefore consider 
selecting more extravert and emotionally stable individuals as BU controllers if they wish to increase 
the possibility that these controllers will eventually have an impact on strategic decisions. By so doing, 
it may be that controllers are appointed who are not likely to lose their influence on operational decisions 
when they are too lenient – at least, in the eyes of their BU manager.  
 
5.2. Limitations 
This study is subject to a number of limitations. First, we only looked at Dutch organizations and their 
(domestic) BUs. Second, the study was limited to large, multidivisional organizations. On top of this, 
we used a convenience sample (cf. Zoni and Merchant, 2007). Future research could try to assess 
whether our findings remain stable under different conditions. Fourth, the personality traits of BU 
controllers were limited to those included in the Ten Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) instrument. 
-17- 
 
Although this instrument is relatively simple and effective (Gosling et al., 2003), it may be that our 
results are influenced by self-reporting biases and respondents’ tendencies to provide socially desirable 
answers on these items. This raises the question whether controllers were aware of their generally held 
self-image when they completed the survey (cf. Zimmerman, 2014), and whether the results reflected 
their actual beliefs. Although the absence of socially desirable answers cannot be fully guaranteed, we 
believe there is sufficient variance in the answers with respect to the personality trait items shown in 
Table I, for instance, and with respect to OPERPIM and STRATPIM to claim that such answers are 
largely absent. Fifth, this study did not cover personal skills, such as communicative, technical, or 
interpersonal skills (Rouwelaar, 2015), nor did it analyze interpersonal relationships between BU 
controllers and BU managers in great detail (Katz and Khan, 1978). Finally, we used Matĕjka’s (2002) 
instrument to measure controller influence. Thus, we could only assess the perceived influence 
controllers had on the decisions taken by their managers, and not their actual involvement in these 
decisions. 
 
5.3 Future research 
Quantitative studies assessing controllers’ degree of influence on managerial decisions are scarce. This 
study contributes to this body of literature, although it only investigated the perceptions of BU 
controllers. As was stated above, in order to assess BU controller influence on managerial decisions in 
greater detail, future studies could include BU managers as respondents, on top of, or instead of, BU 
controllers (cf. Pierce and O’Dea, 2003; Byrne and Pierce, 2007; Wolf et al., 2015).  
More attention could also be devoted to other (not yet tested) factors that might impact on 
perceived controller influence in management and/or controller involvement in management. Two of 
these factors are a BU manager’s leadership style, and his/her management philosophy. Besides a greater 
emphasis on the characteristics of BU managers, future research could focus on other organizational 
factors than the ones included in this study, such as corporate strategy or the impact of ICT developments 
on the management control system a BU uses. 
BU managers can influence BU controllers’ performance, but this is also influenced by the way 
in which BU controllers succeed in influencing and persuading their BU managers (Roozen and Steens, 
2006, p. 101; Lambert and Sponem, 2012; Wolf et al., 2015). Future research could investigate how 
these relations work exactly. This would help in assessing the impact of interpersonal relationships on 
BU controllers’ influence on managerial decisions (Katz and Kahn, 1978). Perhaps more interesting 
results will be found for STRATPIM than for OPERPIM, as only influence on strategic decisions 
(STRATPIM) seems to require negotiations and mutual adjustments between BU managers and BU 
controllers. 
More research on the way in which differences between strategic and operational controller 
influence and/or involvement manifest themselves could help in developing a more solid theoretical 
framework for perceived controller influence in management and/or controller involvement in 
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management (Sathe, 1982) and their consequences for a BU’s functioning (Hartmann and Maas, 2010; 
Weiβenberger and Angelkort, 2011; Wolf et al., 2015).  
Finally, existing research suggests that management teams ought to include a combination of 
people with different personality traits to operate effectively (Howard and Howard, 2001). This raises 
questions about the way in which the inclusion of BU controllers might contribute to the mix of 




1. The terms ‘controller’ and ‘management accountant’ are used interchangeably throughout 
continental Europe (Wolf et al., 2015). We will use the term ‘controller’ from here onward. 
2. The Zoni and Merchant (2007) study was conducted at the corporate level instead of the BU 
level. 
3. The opposite of ‘emotional stability’ is known as ‘neuroticism’ (Digman, 1990, p. 422). 
4. To check for robustness, we also estimated our model with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
techniques. The results (not tabulated in this paper) were very similar. 
5. According to a Mann-Whitney test (Mann-Whitney U = 3322.5, Z = -6.766, p = 0.000) and a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (2-tailed: Z = 3.072, p = 0.000). 
6. Collinearity statistics indicate that multicollinearity is not a major concern (all VIF-scores are 
considerably smaller than 10) (Hair et al., 2010).  
7. Even though the correlation between OPEN and EXTRAV (r = 0.405) is less than 0.50, we 
decided to control for possible interaction effects between these two variables. The path 
coefficients (from OPEN to EXTRAV and from EXTRAV to OPEN) are significantly different 
from zero (path = 0.427, p = 0.000). However, the coefficients of the other paths (not included 
in this paper) are comparable to the ones presented in Table III and Figure II. All conclusions 
about the hypotheses remain unchanged. 
8. We ran a cluster analysis (using Ward’s method) based on the items underlying OPERPIM and 
STRATPIM to check this conclusion (Hair et al., 2010), and found that most of the BU 
controllers in our sample did indeed have a ‘hybrid’ role.  
9. Pierce and O’Dea (2003) may not agree with this statement. They argue that many controllers 
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APPENDIX A: Survey questions, item level descriptives, factor analysis results, and 
indicator loadings from PLS 
 
 Controller Influence (Matĕjka, 2002, p. 67) 
Below is a list of items that have an effect on the bottom-line performance of your BU.  
To what extent can you actually influence what business actions are taken with regard to them? 
(1 = no influence (my role is to present information and report the results of actions taken by operating 
managers); 3 = some influence (my role is to present information and recommend action); 5 = strong 
















C1 Accounts receivable 3.38 1.285 0.181 0.606 0.723 
C2 Inventory 2.78 1.317 - 0.092 0.759 0.785 
C3 Operating expenses 3.63 0.929 0.169 0.664 0.650 
C4 Capital expenses 3.32 1.301 0.487 0.422 Dropped 
C5 Incentive systems within your 
BU 
2.71 1.322 0.780 0.053 0.793 
C6 Targeted customer segments 2.28 1.085 0.684 0.171 0.616 
C7 Offered range of products or 
services 
2.25 1.047 0.753 0.027 0.844 
    
 
 
Personal Characteristics: Ten Item Personality Inventory (Gosling et al., 2003, p. 525) 
Please indicate your personal characteristics. I see myself as: 
(1 = disagree strongly; 2 = disagree a little; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 4 = agree a little;  
5 = agree strongly)  
 










P1 Extravert, enthusiastic 3.68 1.178 0.814 -0.057 0.005 -0.051 0.258 
P2 Critical, quarrelsome 3.96 0.969 -0.120 0.017 0.694 0.212 -0.201 
P3 Dependable, self-
disciplined 
4.18 0.863 -0.106 0.840 0.049 -0.006 0.230 
P4 Anxious, easily upset 1.82 0.983 0.046 0.002 0.011 0.927 0.016 
P5 Open to new experiences, 
complex 
4.24 0.810 0.244 0.022 -0.106 0.060 0.861 
P6 Reserved, quiet 2.75 1.166 0.828 -0.194 0.139 -0.061 -0.070 
P7 Sympathetic, warm 3.63 0.882 0.059 0.027 0.860 -0.135 0.088 
P8 Disorganized, careless 1.57 0.869 0.011 0.889 -0.014 0.080 -0.140 
P9 Calm, rational 4.03 0.897 -0.372 0.237 0.082 0.527 0.445 
P10 Conventional, uncreative 4.18 0.863 0.685 0.170 -0.314 0.061 0.095 
 
Calculations: OPEN = P5 + (6 – P10); CONSC = P3 + (6 – P8); EXTRAV = P1 + (6 – P6); AGREA = P7 + (6 – P2);  













 Decentralization (Abernethy et al., 2004, p. 564) 
Please indicate who can make the following decisions. 
(5 = 100% your business unit; 1 = 100% (corporate) organization)  
  




D1 Strategic decisions (e.g., development of 
new products; enter and develop new 
markets; unit strategy) 
2.94 1.174 0.778 0.734 
D2 Investment decisions (e.g., acquiring new 
assets and financing investment projects; 
information systems) 
2.76 1.242 0.712 0.613 
D3 Marketing decisions (e.g., campaigns; 
pricing decisions) 
3.76 1.231 0.944 0.759 
D4 Decision regarding internal processes 
(e.g., setting production/sales priorities; 
inputs used and/or processes employed to 
fill orders; contracting suppliers) 
4.07 1.039 0.789 0.671 
D5 Human Resources (e.g., hiring/firing; 
compensation and setting career paths for 
the personnel employed within your unit; 
reorganizing your unit; creation of new 
jobs) 
3.75 0.967 0.486 0.582 





 Information Asymmetry (adapted from Dunk, 1993; Abernethy et al., 2004, p. 565) 
We would like some information about the distribution of knowledge between your  
BU and the (corporate) organization. (1 = corporate controller is much more familiar; 5 = I am more familiar) 
 




IA1 Compared to your Corporate Controller, 
who is in possession of better information 
regarding the activities undertaken in your 
BU? 
4.49 0.659 0.795 0.789 
IA2 Compared to your Corporate Controller, 
who is more familiar with the input-output 
relationships inherent in the internal 
operations of you BU? 
4.23 0.846 0.748 0.759 
IA3 Compared to your Corporate Controller, 
who is more certain of the performance 
potential of your BU? 
4.09 0.802 0.812 0.814 
IA4 Compared to your Corporate Controller, 
who is more familiar technically with the 
work of your BU? 
4.35 0.828 0.755 0.739 
IA5 Compared to your Corporate Controller, 
who is better able to assess the potential 
impact on your activities of factors external 
to your BU? 











Performance of your BU (Bouwens and Van Lent, 2007) 
Please indicate the performance of your BU: Performance in comparison with external BUs and internal 
BUs (1 = lower than most; 3 = about average; 5 = higher than most). 
 




Q1 How would you rate last year’s 
performance of your BU compared 
to external firms producing similar 
products/services? 
3.38 1.142 0.845 0.855 
Q2 Please rate last year’s performance 
of your BU against that of other 
business units in your organization 
3.57 1.038 0.842 0.812 
Q3 How would you rate last year’s 
performance of your BU compared 
to your superior’s expectations? 
3.20 1.117 0.890 0.905 
      
 
 
 
 
